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Introduction  
 
In the 1990s large Russian cities and their metropolitan areas served as centres 
of political, economic and social modernisation, but other regional territories 
were lost in the peripheries.1 Peripheral territories, being isolated from 
resource centres, still suffer from a number of negative circumstances. 
Regarding the Russian European North, we should consider the constant 
population decrease, low quality of human capital and economic dependence 
on natural resources. These factors negatively influence socioeconomic life 
within the North, and particularly, its small entrepreneurship. 
 
This research was done in the Komi Republic, one of the Northern Barents 
regions,2 which is famous for “Dutch disease”, or an overdependence on 
natural resources, since the 1990s. In the 1990s Komi received 63% of its 
export income through oil sales. This, James Alexander mentions, made 
                                                          
* Ukhta State Technical University, Department of Education and Philosophy, senior 
researcher, Russia, Komi Republic, Ukhta city. 
1 Vladimir Gel’man, “In Search of Local Autonomy: the Politics of Big Cities in Russia’s 
Transition”, International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 27, no. 1 (March 2003): 
50.   
2 See the map of the Barents region at Appendix 1.  
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“Komi particularly vulnerable to the international markets”.3 While 
economists argue about the threat to small firms’ well-being in economies 
with great reliance on its natural resources, nowadays the regional 
government proclaims the increase in natural resources extraction as the way 
to overcome the economic crisis.   
 
Infrastructure difficulties and undeveloped transport connections also 
threaten the growth of entrepreneurship in the Komi Republic. Small and mid-
size entrepreneurship is mostly concentrated in urban areas of the region 
(about 80%). Trade, retail and real estate are the most attractive sectors for 
small entrepreneurs in the Komi Republic.4 The region is becoming 
depopulated: by 2000 the population was down to one million, and by 2013 
was inhabited by less than 880 thousand persons. According to the Russian 
Federal State Statistics Service, by 2030 the Komi Republic will become one 
of the least populated regions in Russia, along with a few others in the North 
and in Siberia.5     
 
The mentioned circumstances increase the vulnerability of small 
entrepreneurship and private property in the Russian Northern regions, while 
property rights generally used to be insecure in Russia since the 1990s.6 While 
                                                          
3 James Alexander, “Komi and the Centre: Developing Federalism in an Era of 
Socioeconomic Crisis,” in Unity or Separation. Centre-Periphery Relations in the Former 
Soviet Union, ed. by Daniel Kepton and Terry Clark (Westport&Connecticut&London: 
PRAEGER, 2002), 66.     
4 Vladimir Abrashkin, “Komi Republic: Preventing the Paradox of Plenty through Effective 
Natural Resource Management”, thesis, (State University of New York, Empire State College, 
2015). 
5 Indicators of population. Federal State Statistical Service. URL: 
http://www.gks.ru/wps/wcm/connect/rosstat_main/rosstat/en/figures/population/  
6 Vadim Volkov, Violent Entrepreneurship. The Use of Force in the Making of Russian 
Capitalism (New York: Cornell University Press, 2002); Stanislav Markus, Property, 
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the vast majority of the literature on  private business  in the former Soviet 
Union focuses on elites and large business, where sources of capital were 
often found through personal connections and corruption,7 few scholars have 
argued about the importance of social networks for small and mid-size firms 
in dealing with unstable institutions and corrupt bureaucrats.8  
 
In the specific northern region of Russia, I observed how small and mid-size 
entrepreneurs survive in a risky environment, how they use social capital and 
personal connections to state officials to develop their operations. Where 
social capital within a market is the focus, it could be regarded as a security 
factor. Entrepreneurship in developing economies is especially characterised 
by uncertainty, and a number of risks and threats produced by the state and 
private actors. From the human security perspective, which also includes 
economic security, social capital strengthens economic obligations and social 
expectations. As mentioned, if formal institutions are weak and state agents 
corrupt, market actors have to cope using different strategies for their security. 
My research focused on the implementation of social capital as carried out by 
                                                          
Predation and Protection: Piranha Capitalism in Russia and Ukraine (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2015).  
7 Oxana Green, Entrepreneurship in Russia: Western Ideas in Russian Translation 
(Gothenburg: University of Gothenburg, 2009); Alena Ledeneva, How Russia Really Works. 
The Informal Practices That Shaped Post-Soviet Politics and Business (New York: Cornell 
University Press, 2006).   
8 Anton Oleinik, Market as a Weapon. The Socio-Economic Machinery of Dominance in 
Russia (London&New York: Routledge, 2011); William Miller, Äse B. Grodeland, Tatyana 
Y. Koshechkina, A Culture Of Corruption? Coping with Government in Post-communist 
Europe (Budapest: CEU Press, 2001); Maria Sakaeva, “Businessmen in Legislative Regional 
Bodies: Status as Protection and Preference” [Bisnesmeny v regional’nih parlamentah: status 
kak zachita i preferencia], Sociological Studies 4 (2016): 142-146; Maria Sakaeva, 
“Parliament as a “Window of Opportunities”: the Research of how Entrepreneurs with Deputy 
Status Achieve their Economic Interests” [Parlament kak okno vozmoznostey: issledovanie 
povedenia predprinimateley s deputatskim mandatom], Economic Sociology 13, no. 3 (2012): 
96-122  
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specific entrepreneurs. I define them as specific because they occupy the 
positions of elected officials at regional and local legislations. Hence, they 
have an official political affiliation and a double identity – business and 
political. It should be mentioned, that political affiliation divides into official 
and shadow. Official political affiliation requires a political status - a position 
of elected officials, for instance.   
 
The focus on persons requires attention to the concept of human security, 
defined quite broadly as the security of livelihood (food, energy, 
environmental needs and economic security). While in developing market 
economies, small and mid-size entrepreneurs provide for a great amount of 
the human needs of everyday life (food, clothing, services, etc.), the issue of 
business security lies within the broader agenda of human security. As 
phenomena emerging from and for the sake of social relations, social capital 
and human security appear to be neither only an individual, nor just a 
collective property, but both. In this paper I argue that the trust networks and 
personal connections to state agents9 and politicians provide the specific 
entrepreneurs with opportunities to minimise or avoid risks for their firms and 
property, and hence to protect their ownership and business activities.  
 
I will first provide a brief description of the institutional design of sub-
national governance in Russia. I will then discuss theories that concern the 
institutional dimension of property rights and informality in business. 
Investigation of informality and trust networks requires first a description of 
the theories of social capital appropriated for my research topic, and then, an 
                                                          
9 I follow Stanislav Markus, who defines state agents as state authorities, bureaucrats, state 
employees. For more see:  Stanislav Markus Property, Predation, 57-58, 89, 113.  
67 
 
account of my data collection and research methods. I present some of the 
resources and opportunities available to entrepreneurs with a “double 
identity” resulting from their special relations to state agencies and 
politicians. Finally, I observe how social capital works in the “shadow 
sphere”: generally, the different practices of informal entrepreneurial 
behaviour, and why and under what circumstances small and mid-size 
entrepreneurs with a double identity practice informal relations.   
 
The Institutional Design of Sub-National Russian Governance   
 
In 2003 president Vladimir Putin fundamentally changed the design of sub-
national governance – both at regional and local levels. Changes in the 
functioning of Russian regional government included the replacement of 
popular elections for regional governors (gubernatory) by appointments. The 
popular election of regional assemblies was not ended: members of legislative 
branches are still elected by the citizens of the Russian regions. The federal 
reforms also implemented the division of the Russian Federation into seven 
federal okrugs. Each okrug includes about 10 regions.10     
 
The institutional framework of local governance was also seriously modified. 
With the 2003 municipal reform there are three main tiers of local 
government: settlements (poseleniya), municipal counties (municipal’nyye 
rayony) and urban districts (gorodskiye okruga). The second tier is the 
municipal county (MR) which covers larger territories and comprises groups 
                                                          
10 North-West Federal okrug includes the city of Saint-Petersburg and 10 regions, including 
all territories of the Russian Barents region: Komi Republic, Karelia Republic, Novgorod, 
Pskov, Vologda, Arkhangelsk, Kaliningrad, Murmansk and Leningrad regions, Nenets 
autonomous district (See Appendix 1).  
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of settlements. The third is the city district (gorodskoy okrug, GO).11 City 
districts and municipal counties are governed by elected bodies, which in the 
case of cities are defined as “city soviets”. City soviets are not been precisely 
legislative bodies, because they are not allowed to produce laws or other 
legislative initiatives. 
 
Contrary to the restriction on the election of regional governors, the 2003 law 
provided the procedures for election and appointment of the chief executive 
figure at the municipal, county and city district levels. There are two executive 
officials – a mayor (the political face of the locality) and a head of 
administration (city manager).12 City managers were elected by the members 
of city soviets from among themselves. Mayors continued to be popularly 
elected, as in the 1990s. However, in 2014 the Federal Parliament (State 
Duma) passed the next law limiting popular elections in Russia. Accordingly, 
the implementation of, or restriction on the popular election of mayors was 
left to the choice of regional governors. By 2015 all Russian regions had 
implemented the restriction on the popular election of mayors. Moreover, 
some regions had restricted mayors’ elections even before the decision of 
State Duma. Nowadays, a mayor and a city manager both are de jure elected 
(de facto appointed) by the members of the city soviets from among 
themselves.  
 
                                                          
11 Tomila Lankina, “Local Government”, in Routledge Handbook of Russian Politics and 
Society, ed. Graeme Gill, James Young (London&New York: Routledge, 2012), 165.   
12 Darrell Slider, “Governors versus Mayors: The Regional Dimension of Russian Local 
Government”, in Local Government in Russia, ed. Alfred B. Evans Jr., Vladimir Gel’man 
(Oxford: Rowman&Littlefield Publishers, 2004), 145-146.   
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Putin’s reforms of government have undercut democracy and the powers of 
regional and local authorities. However, changes in institutional design have 
not decreased the movement of businesspeople to elected political bodies. 
Contrary to the restrictions on business activity for the members of Russian 
Federal Parliament, business activity is allowed for members of regional 
parliaments and city soviets, both for full-time and part-time members. The 
proportion of full-time lawmakers in Russian regions and local communities 
has decreased: since the beginning of the 2010s, regional and local governors 
have eliminated their portion. For example, in 2012 the regional parliament 
of the Komi Republic passed a law by which the number of full-time 
parliament members should be no less than 30%, contrary to the previous 
50%. Not surprisingly, it caused the significant presence of businesspeople in 
Russian regional parliaments. As I will show below, in case of North-West 
federal okrug the average amount of parliament members elected from 
different businesses is about 50 %, with the highest proportion in Arkhangelsk 
region – 60 %, and the least amount in Nenets autonomous district – 36 %  
(see Appendix 2).     
 
The highest portion of full-time members in city soviets have been fixed at 
10% by the Russian federal law on local government.  Full-time members are 
paid a fixed salary and required to be regularly involved in legislative 
activities and, most importantly, they have a higher level of responsibility. 
Cuts in the number of full-time parliament members means that the rest of the 
parliament or city soviet seats (that is, unpaid positions) can be occupied – 
primarily – by businesspeople.  
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Theoretical Framework   
 
According to economic theory, property rights are one of the basic economic 
institutions for reducing costs, risks and uncertainty. Armen Alchian and 
Harold Demsetz note that despite a strong property rights’ agenda in the social 
sciences, many questions have still not been investigated. Particularly, the 
social conditions necessary for property rights to function, and their changes 
in time and space.13 Neoclassical economic theory concerns the gap between 
ideal types of property rights and reality. According to new institutional 
theory, property rights play the most important role in business security and 
economic growth. My research is about relations between business owners 
and a range of different actors (state officials, market players and politicians), 
which is why property rights are understood as a field of interaction between 
economic and state representatives, between individuals, groups and other 
actors.14 
 
Douglass North and Barry Weingast point to the main dilemma of the 
economic politics – protection and grabbing. The state is strong enough for 
both strategies.15 A grabbing state is a serious danger for owners, when state 
agents (mainly bureaucrats) have the freedom to violate laws.16 Stanislav 
Markus points out that the predominant state-centric concepts in the debate 
                                                          
13 Armen Alchian and Harold Demsetz, “The Property Right Paradigm,” The Journal of 
Economic History 33, no 1 (March 1973): 18. 
14 Douglass C. North, “Institutions and Credible Commitment,” Journal of Institutional and 
Theoretical Economics (JITE) 149, no. 1 (March 1993): 11-23. 
15 Douglass C. North, John J. Wallis, and Barry R. Weingast, Violence and Social Orders: A 
Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Recorded Human History (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2009).  
16 Joel S Hellman, Geraint Jones and Daniel Kaufmann, “Seize the State, Seize the Day: State 
Capture and Influence in Transition Economies”, Journal of Comparative Economics 31, no. 
4 (December 2003): 754. 
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about property rights and private entrepreneurship in developing market 
economies underestimate bottom-up initiatives by the potential victims of 
property rights violations. He suggests paying more attention to local 
practices rather than to institutional design and central policy initiatives.17 In 
my research on specific entrepreneurs, I take Markus’ work as my point of 
departure, following his idea that bottom-up activities favouring business 
protection require more attention. I address the capability of small market 
players to decrease their vulnerability. They seek alternatives through formal 
political positions, that is, membership in legislative bodies. However, my 
research differs from Markus’ design, because its focus on small market 
players instead of large firms, like the ones he investigated in Russia and 
Ukraine.  
 
According to new institutional economists, property rights are shaped by 
institution-building. Douglass North defines institutions as the rules of the 
game, which limit the freedom of individual choice.18 They focus on how 
institutions prevent individuals’ illegal behaviour. New institutionalism 
proves the crucial role of the state in the protection of property rights. 
According to the theory, state intervention in the economy should be limited. 
As Thriann Eggertsson argues, within the property field a correspondence is 
required between social norms and formal rules.19  
 
The idea of the dependency of market development on social relations is not 
new. In the 1970s, Mark Granovetter considered the importance of personal 
                                                          
17 Markus, Property, Predation, 44-45. 
18 North, Institutions and Credible Commitment, 12. 
19 Eggertsson, Economic Behavior and Institutions, 101-102.  
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trust and social relations for markets and private business.20 He emphasised 
the productive influence of social connections on the market process. Social 
capital can be implemented productively within markets, social networks 
promote cooperation and solidarity for intra-firm and inter-firm relations. 
 
In the 1990s, the euphoria towards the positive influence of social capital on 
society was disproved by studies of developing states and transition 
economies, including Latin America and the former Soviet Union. Supporting 
the idea that the lack of social trust weakens contracts and agreements, authors 
showed that social capital and personal trust can be fertile soil for 
corruption,21 for shadow trade, drugs and weapons trafficking.22 Contrary, 
Apostolis Papakostas in his book “Civilizing the Public Sphere: Distrust, 
Trust and Corruption” attacks not only the normative view of social capital 
and personal trust, but also challenges cultural studies of corruption and 
informality.23  
 
Theories of social capital develop the sociocultural dimension within market 
studies that are closely connected with the property rights paradigm. 
Researchers of social capital used to overestimate its productive functions for 
society: information, communication, education, etc. They noted that social 
capital is highly useful in local communities, especially those which face a 
shortage of financial and other material resources, so that society should work 
                                                          
20 Mark Granovetter, “The Strength of Weak Ties”, American Journal of Sociology 78, no. 6 
(May 1970): 1360-380.  
21 Susan Rose-Ackerman, Corruption and Government: Causes, Consequences, and Reform 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999).  
22 Alejandro Portes, “Social Capital: Its Origins and Applications in Modern Sociology”, 
Annual Review of Sociology, no. 24 (1998): 1-24.  
23 Apostolis Papakostas, Civilizing the Public Sphere: Distrust, Trust and Corruption (New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012).  
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on the promotion of social capital. Robert Putnam defined the concept of 
social capital in its connections to culture, cooperation, mutual support and 
interpersonal trust.24 Putnam’s thesis of the dominance of social capital over 
material resources applies to Russia. As I show below, trust and reputation 
are significant for local business because they can be converted into other 
types of capital.  
 
The conception of social capital adopted in this paper closely parallels that of 
James Coleman. He developed the so-called net approach, defining social 
capital as intergroup resources important to rational and self-interested actors. 
People and groups mostly implement horizontal social ties and connections 
within a group because their goals cannot be achieved without them.25 The 
net approach to social capital is more appropriate for my research because 
entrepreneurs evaluate any resource, including social capital, in terms of 
rationality and utility. Rationality and utility constrain a key part of the net 
approach to social capital. Moreover, the security of market players depends 
on their capacity to get access to informal, politically enrooted nets. Contrary 
to J. Coleman, who defined social capital as a contribution to group well-
being and security, my research shows that personal connections of specific 
entrepreneurs seem to be a contribution to their individual security. It means 
that social capital is personal, rather than group resources.  
 
                                                          
24 Robert Putnam, Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community (New 
York: Simon&Schuster, 2000), 93-113. 
25 James S. Coleman, “Social Capital in the Creation of Human-Capital”, American Journal 
of Sociology, no. 94 (1988): 98. 
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Social capital can be viewed as a security factor because of one more reason. 
In the case of fragmented societies, different local networks and institutions 
do not seek interaction. As Zora Popova notes, “trust and norms at the micro-
level are present only among the members” of a particular community.26 I 
also investigate the role of social capital in property rights security on the 
ground level, that is, in local communities and among small market players.  
 
More broadly, security of property rights could be seen as the core factor of 
human security within the particular local community, while local 
entrepreneurs – not large companies or the state – provide for the everyday 
needs and services of citizens. According to the Commission on Human 
Security, human security means not only the amount of human rights, but 
“creating political, social, environmental, economic and cultural systems, that 
together give people the building blocks of survival, livelihood and dignity”.27 
From that point of view, it is also important that systems-building is a bottom-
up process to no less an extent than it is a ruler-centric one. Entrepreneurs’ 
strategies for dealing with state officials, with or against unstable laws and 
rules, influence their sustainable development, and ultimately, the 
sustainability of local communities.   
 
 
 
 
                                                          
26 Zora Popova, “The Social Capital as a Security Factor”, Journal of Regional Security 7, no. 
1 (2012): 8-9.  
27 Human Security Now. Commission on Human Security. New York 2003. URL: 
http://www.un.org/humansecurity/sites/www.un.org.humansecurity/files/chs_final_report_-
_english.pdf (Retrieved 15 October 2017). P. 3-4. 
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Data and Methods 
 
This paper examines the role of social capital and informal relations in small 
and mid-size entrepreneurs in Russian cities. Social research on informality 
requires qualitative methods, particularly interviews. All the semi-structured 
and in-depth interviews were collected by the author in two cities of the Komi 
Republic in 2012–2015.28 Out of 28 interviews, 6 were conducted with small 
and mid-size entrepreneurs with any type of  parliament membership 
(regional or local), 11 with small and mid-size entrepreneurs with extensive 
business experience and without official parliament affiliation, 5 with state 
actors ( members of  regional parliaments29 and city soviets, political party 
functionaries), and  6 with experts (from media, business associations, and 
lawyers). Of the interviewed business actors, three-quarters represent small 
business. Among interviewed legislative members, one-half represents the 
local (municipal) level.     
 
In order to show the high amount of members with business background in 
regional parliaments I collected the quantitative data about the occupations of 
the parliaments’ members in North-West Federal Okrug (see Appendix 2). 
Data collection was made from the official websites of each regional 
parliament.   Indeed, North-West regional parliaments contain a large 
complement of members with backgrounds in private business and state-
owned enterprises – an average of 50 % in the parliaments, elected in 2008-
2012 years.  
                                                          
28 Names and personal details of my informants are not provided here because research is 
ongoing on the project and the topic of shadow spheres is sensitive.     
29 The regional parliament of the Komi Republic [Gosudarstvenniy Sovet Respubliki Komi] 
is elected by citizens of the region for four years. 
76 
 
  
Collected data about regional parliaments supports the well-known finding, 
that the Russian socioeconomic system is characterized by the weak division 
of politics, business and civil society. Finally, it limits the number of groups 
with access to political and economic resources and who wield authority.30 
This also caused a methodological problem, in that the precise differentiation 
of my informants on the basis of formal positions was hardly possible. 
Particularly, the interviewed heads of regional and municipal business 
associations identified themselves as experienced entrepreneurs. In truth, 
many executives of quasi-civil organizations moved there from the business 
sphere. Not rarely the leaders and members of Russian business organizations 
continue their own business activities.    
 
I designed and piloted a qualitative survey of small entrepreneurs with 
parliament membership in Saint Petersburg between January and May 2009, 
as a master’s paper at the European University of Saint-Petersburg. The 
research started in 2008 with the question about benefits and opportunities 
available to the entrepreneurs with deputy membership (regional and 
municipal levels) – the business activity of those members of local 
parliaments and municipal bodies who came to politics from business. At 
first, my interest was in their motivation, election strategies and the resources 
they extract for their firms through deputy status. The pilot survey showed 
that the productive research question however should be more about trust 
                                                          
30 According to the concept of social development created by D. North, J. Wallis and B. 
Weingast, Post-Soviet states are included among the societies of limited access. For more 
see: Douglass C. North, John J. Wallis, and Barry R. Weingast. Violence and Social Orders: 
A Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Recorded Human History (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2009), 148-189. 
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networks and informal relations created by specific entrepreneurs in the 
political sphere, rather than just about benefits and opportunities for their 
businesses.  
 
The pilot survey also showed how to interview several groups of informants 
in order to encourage more appropriate and complete data. Also strategies 
were needed to encourage honesty in the interviews. First, it was emphasised 
that the use of the recording device and personal details were optional. Many 
interviewees agreed to being recorded, but some requested anonymity and 
requested handwritten records only. Second, I established my credentials by 
providing links to my academic publications and confirmation of my identity 
at the relevant universities. Also used were well-known approaches to asking 
sensitive questions (third-party perspective; normalisation of wrongdoing, 
etc.). 
 
The study used a “snowball” method and chain-referral sampling to find and 
select interviews (Tansey 2007). The interviews of business and state actors 
relied more on chain referrals due to the shadow topic. Using the existing 
networks, which included both personal and professional nets I created a 
snowball sample, never interviewing more than 3 persons from the same 
network. From 2012 until 2014 I worked for a regional newspaper, covering 
social and economic fields. Attendance of business and policy-related events 
in the Komi capital allowed me to develop a range of useful contacts.. Also 
in 2015-2016 a set of audio records and comprehensive observations were 
made during public discussions and round tables in the capital, where the 
topics relied on contemporary problems in regional state-business relations 
and challenges to entrepreneurship in Komi.  
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Interviewing small and mid-size entrepreneurs, both with and without 
parliament membership, I asked about negative and positive features of 
business activity in Russia, including questions which concerned threats to 
business, and ways of protection. Also of interest was to what extent and for 
what reasons social relations with the state’s agents are profitable for business 
owners. All the entrepreneurs were asked how they collect, use and transform 
social relations and personal ties to politicians and state agents. Interviews 
with experts allowed me to analyse the informal behaviour of entrepreneurs, 
the business opportunities and strategies of those players who occupy a 
privileged position on the market.  
 
Institutional Trust and Business Security  
 
Research on specific entrepreneurs adds a new aspect to the discussion about 
institutional trust. Anthony Giddens defines institutional trust as trust shown 
towards abstract systems (laws, courts, constitutions, financial system, etc.).31 
Entrepreneurs with and without parliament membership have different 
attitudes towards courts and the legal mechanisms of property protection. 
Politically non-affiliated entrepreneurs state that, except in rare cases, it is 
impossible for small and mid-size businesses to appeal against sanctions. 
Moreover, appeals or taking matters to court can have unpredictable effects, 
for example, pressure on businesses, or unscheduled inspections by state 
representatives. In contrast to ordinary businesspeople, actors with a “double 
identity” can more successfully apply to the law. 
                                                          
31 Anthony Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1990), 102-104.   
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The challenge is not that entrepreneurs simply do not trust the state and its 
institutions. Even according to classic economic theory, the state does not 
deserve trust, because of the opposing interests of state agents and market 
actors.32 The challenge for the state and its sustainability is that entrepreneurs 
perceive the state as a potentially disruptive, ineffective agent interested only 
in confiscating part of their private benefits not rarely in violent ways.  
 
The Russian state, respondents point out, at any time can seize their profits on 
legal grounds. Talking about the state’s “grabbing hand”, very often they 
mean the imposition of taxes. High and changeable taxation – in the context 
of high-level corruption – negatively influences the willingness of 
entrepreneurs to pay taxes. Respondents guess that changeable game rules are 
beneficial to the state and its agents: the federal government creates and 
modifies “traps” for businesses in order to extract as much profit for the state 
budget as possible. The amounts of taxes and fines are not based on fairness 
and the law, but on political, elite-connected interests and short-term aims. 
The following interview illustrates the idea.    
 
I do not like the state system. Let’s have a look at fiscal politics. The tax police 
has a plan, right? But, I am not sure. Me, my firm, was checked by the tax 
police for four months. A tax inspector called me before the inspection and 
said: “Well, your quiet life is over. There is a deficit of money for the Sochi 
Olympic Games.33 We have received the resolution from above to double tax 
fees”. After that they [tax inspectors] came and started checking. The tax 
                                                          
32 North, Wallis, Weingast, Violence and Social Orders, 15, 88-89. 
33 The 2014 Winter Olympic Games took place in the city of Sochi, Russia.  
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police take the position that all of us [entrepreneurs] owe some duties to them. 
But contrarily, they have their own duties towards us. From the tax police’s 
view we are a priori guilty – they believe that we are not honest. The tax 
inspection, I’ll just mention, ended with nothing; moreover, they found out 
that the regional taxation agency was in debt to my firm. (an entrepreneur, 
owner of a computer service)       
 
My respondents point to the following list of dangers and difficulties for small 
business: high taxes, unstable, inconsistent and complex state regulations, 
illegal inspections and administrative barriers, bribe-seeking bureaucrats. 
Respondents agree that state agents do not respect private owners and 
businesses as the sphere of independent, private economic activity. Tax police 
and other fiscal control bodies provoke especially negative connotations; 
entrepreneurs characterise them as illegitimate and at the least very unfair. 
The Russian state and its agencies are compared with racketeers.34 One 
respondent defined Russian fiscal politics as the “state racket” 
[gosudarstvennyi reket], comprising the state’s activities and decisions in tax 
policy, the levels of taxes and fines, the uncertainty and changeability of taxes 
and fines. The respondents’ opinion is that tax police and other regulatory 
agencies serve mainly to create financial costs and barriers for entrepreneurs.  
 
Compared to the 1990s, since the beginning of the 2010s the main threats to 
property rights have been created by state officials and politicians. My 
findings support the arguments of other scholars about the replacement of 
market predators (gangs, organised criminal groups) by state predators, 
                                                          
34 A racketeer is a person engaging in a racket – illegal violent activity. “Racket” refers more 
specifically to the activities of organized criminal groups.    
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including low-level state agents. Each group of interviewees very often said 
that various state agents are not able to protect business, but prefer instead to 
act as predators. When a firm becomes larger and more successful, state 
officials start to show great interest in it. What is more, bureaucrats are not 
interested any more in getting regular financial benefits (through bribes or 
other corruption practices), as it used to be in the 1990s, but they now seek to 
capture entrepreneurs’ ownership rights. 
 
The particular group from which causes the greatest danger in today’s Russia 
are the so-called siloviki.35 Insecure property rights are caused by institutional 
features of the business environment. The siloviki have occupied privileged 
positions among the Russian political elites for about the last 15 years on both 
the federal and regional levels. Not surprisingly, they have many 
opportunities to use state institutions to their own advantages. They can 
initiate firm inspections by any agency with the authority to monitor 
entrepreneurial activity. 
 
In the 1990s we [small entrepreneurs] were very scared of reketiers.36 My car 
was set on fire by them. And now who is scaring us? Those [guys] with the 
shoulder straps.37 They are more dangerous, a million times more than the 
reketiers. You have a factory for example. A Silovik might call you and say: 
“If you do not give it to me, I will do something to be able to arrest you – put 
                                                          
35 Members of the coercive agencies of the state (e.g., the police, military, security services, 
customs). In Russia there are also the Federal Security Service, Military Police, Ministry of 
Internal Affairs, etc. 
36 The organized criminal community, street gangs, alliances of mainly young men or boys, 
have produced many dangers for small entrepreneurs and small business in Russian cities in 
the 1990s.  
37 The respondent means the members of the coercive agencies of the state. 
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drugs into your pocket or into your car”. Or whatever… Everything is easy 
today. (interview with a local parliament member, small entrepreneur in 
trade business).      
 
The privatization of institutions38 by powerful individuals and groups 
negatively influences the business environment. Kathryn Hendley et al. note 
that in the mid-1990s 61% of Russian firms applied to courts or were ready 
to in some cases. Moreover, entrepreneurs highly esteemed this method of 
enforcing the order and the law.39 Contrary, others argue, that in the 2000s 
weak state institutions and insecure property rights cause distrust towards the 
state and official rules.40 
 
Entrepreneurs with Deputy Status: How Social Capital Works 
 
As I mentioned, the opportunity to avoid or minimise risks is the crucial 
function of deputy status for entrepreneurs. The following opportunities are 
the most important.   
 
Protection from capture and state violence. For my research, it was highly 
important to understand whether political status is being used for business 
protection and what kind of protection it allows. Corporate raiding, siloviki, 
                                                          
38 “Privatization of the state” means that various bureaucrats or clans of bureaucrats, under 
the guise of belonging to national state institutions and organizations, as representatives of 
the state apply power and administrative resources to advance personal or group interests. 
The phenomenon is widespread among developing market economies, including Post-
Soviet states.  (For more see: Stanislav Markus, Property, Predation, 86-88).   
39 Kathryn Hendley, Peter Murrell, and Randi Ryterman, “Law, Relationships and Private 
Enforcement: Transactional Strategies of Russian Enterprises,” Europe-Asia Studies 52, no. 
4 (June 2000): 644. 
40 Ella Paneyakh, The Rules of the Game.    
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business capture – these topics have already been well investigated in post-
soviet studies. My respondents stressed protection from capture and attacks 
as one of the main privileges of being politically affiliated market actors. 
Owners of a double identity have the opportunity to resist raiders through their 
personal ties within political and administrative bodies. This can be used in 
case of real or potential dangers. My research shows that in a face of state 
predators,  specific entrepreneurs stay safer, compared to ordinary 
entrepreneurs.     
 
“I can resist for a long time, because I am a public figure. I have worked here 
[in the regional parliament] for so many years that it is not easy to run me 
over. (interview with member of regional parliament, businessman).  
 
Privileges available to specific entrepreneurs are not caused simply by 
political status: personal abilities and attempts to be included in the social ties 
and relations to political class members and powerful actors are important. In 
case of necessity, such ties can be converted into specific economic benefits.    
 
Unconscionable market practices. As mentioned, Russian small business 
suffers from the “privatization” of state institutions. My research also proves 
that actors with double identity (political and business) are able to use their 
status as a weapon against market competitors. Not rarely, my informants 
among small entrepreneurs described cases where any entrepreneur in a city 
can face numerous unscheduled inspections initiated by state agencies like 
regional taxation agencies. They mentioned cases of inspections ordered 
specifically by politically affiliated competitor firms, which had particularly 
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or systematically privatised state agencies in order to use so-called 
administrative recourses to compete in a “grabbing” way.  
 
She was not able to compete with my firm and that is why she has “signalized” 
to the tax agency. It is hardly possible to make such a manoeuvre if you do 
not have a patron “upstairs”. If you have a patron it is not a big problem, I 
think. Nowadays it is more difficult to protect your rights in court. To my 
mind, in the past courts were more law-abiding than now (interview with the 
owner of a furniture firm).    
 
As Ella Paneyakh notes, applying the law is not a common way to resolve 
conflicts of interest in Russian small business. On the contrary, the law can 
be used to punish the businesspeople who break informal agreements or 
rules.41 Politically affiliated businesspeople have special relations with the 
law and its representatives. Their experience demonstrates two sides of the 
coin named “political affiliation” – protection and attacks. Being involved in 
political bodies, they have access to extraordinary resources like 
administrative support. While I did not get details about attacks practiced by 
such “unordinary” market players, there is no doubt that such cases happen.  
 
It is possible to go to the police head and request him not to notice some 
dubious cases. I know one parliament member, honestly, he was a member of 
Russian State Duma. He has a large business… He got the support of the head 
of one of the law-enforcement agencies. Doing so, he has not only protected 
his business, but also produced “difficulties” for his competitors (interview 
with a regional parliament member, businessman).   
                                                          
41 Ella Paneyakh, The Rules of the Game, 71-72.   
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Litigation with the state. Russian entrepreneurship has a very specific feature: 
it is impossible to follow all official rules and norms. Ella Paneyakh writes 
about the crucial barrier to small entrepreneurship, defined as the “costs of 
legality” - business costs caused by changeable, contradictory and numerous 
formal rules and norms.42 It means that entrepreneurs have to pay a high price 
if they decide to become visible to the state, to be honest to the state’s 
representatives and to follow its laws conscientiously. Changeable rules can 
be easily reinterpreted by state representatives, but not to the entrepreneur’s 
advantage. State agencies, if they have such an aim, are able to put sanctions 
on a firm.  
 
My informants define their own position as “on the verge of the law”, 
meaning that the state’s control agencies are interested in finding some kind 
of breach of the law, and have great power to define what a legal breach is 
and what is not. Changeability and the contradiction in formal rules cause 
uncertainty in everyday business activity. State inspectors on the ground (e.g. 
sanitation and epidemiology services, firefighters, and others) are highly 
critical in defining whether an entrepreneur is breaking a norm or not. In other 
words, laws and norms relating to business activity are under the continual 
interpretative power of low-level state functionaries.  
 
As mentioned above, the state and its agents act as predators – that is the 
common attitude of all kinds of entrepreneurs encountered in my research. 
However, there are different strategies against this.  Specific entrepreneurs 
actively apply to the courts in administrative disputes with state agencies like 
                                                          
42 Ella Paneyakh, The Rules of the Game, 51.  
86 
 
the tax police, sanitation or fire safety agencies. Litigation with the state, or 
what I call “law attacks” against state agencies, sometimes enable 
businesspersons to reduce economic costs. Being included in political 
structures, specific entrepreneurs have access to “inside” information and 
informal paths of communication to judges. They are thereby more 
experienced in ways of communication within state agencies and political 
bodies, which require attention to specific language, behaviour and particular 
rules. These factors positively influence their ability to protect themselves in 
cases of business risk.  
 
Not so long ago the Agriculture Control Service imposed on me a few fines, 
so I filed court cases and have won two. They [representatives of the 
agricultural service] charged me with the absence of required licenses. They 
demanded the licenses, which did not even exist at that moment, so they did 
not grant me the licenses. They knew that the licenses were a fiction, but 
demanded them anyway. (interview with a mid-size business owner, 
informally politically affiliated, trade business).  
 
Access to state officials. Businesspeople with deputy status, compared to 
ordinary entrepreneurs, have easier access to state officials, city and regional 
politicians. Such privileges seem to be obvious and are expected. However, 
this administrative resource is highly important and is available to specific 
entrepreneurs not simply due to their official positions. Specific entrepreneurs 
do not spend time waiting for doors to open: they do not face the particularly 
Russian bureaucratic paper-war (volokita)43. They have open access to city 
                                                          
43 Volokita is similar to administrative barriers and is defined as obstacles to starting and 
doing business that result from the introduction of excessive bureaucratic procedures and 
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managers, heads of different departments and other officials in order to 
resolve business problems. They become stronger members of the political 
group than of the economic one. 
 
Access to state officials depends on personal abilities, trust, respect and 
personal influence. According to my informants  they do  not just open doors 
and get closer to decision-makers; advantages depend on your personal skills, 
administrative resources and your own level of influence.  
 
Avoiding additional payment. Researches in different Russian regions 
showed that the relationship between local business and authorities is often 
based on the principle of “taxes+”44 or “additional payments”.45 It means, that 
businesspeople are obligated to support financially or by other available 
means the social and economic initiatives of city and regional authorities. My 
respondents also provided some examples. Various material obligations 
burdening local business include not only taxes, but buying buses for public 
transport, building playgrounds for kids, holiday presents for children and 
poor families, disabled and aged people. In order to force entrepreneurs to 
provide unofficial payments, city authorities can use administrative pressure, 
for example, the refusal to grant licenses, operating permits.   
 
Payments are mostly regular and obligatory. Politically affiliated 
entrepreneurs are not excluded from the “taxes+” system; however, they can 
choose to pay or not for a particular purpose. They can accept or ignore an 
                                                          
rules set by different regulatory agencies in some cases (but not always) in order to receive 
additional payments.   
44 Anton Oleinik, Market as a Weapon, 227-228.  
45 Ella Paneyakh, The Rules of the Game, 85-86.  
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offer. They define informal payments as investments, not costs, like ordinary 
entrepreneurs do. In the case of double-identity actors, I define “taxes+” as 
specific investments to reputation: if you pay, in the future you will succeed 
in getting market privileges and benefits from state authorities. There are 
various forms of benefits: licenses and permits required of businesses in a 
particular branch (trade, real estate, etc.), access to information and decision-
makers. It can be considered an exchange – financial and material resources 
must be provided by business in exchange for economic and noneconomic 
advantages given in return by state authorities.    
 
Social Capital in the Shadow  
 
In Russia municipal and regional politics and economic development are 
characterised by the high concentration of power in the hands of city or 
regional authorities. Trustful relations with them have great significance for 
businesspeople. Specific entrepreneurs are therefore willing to become 
members of a so-called “closer circle”. The main condition for membership 
is loyalty. It means that members of regional legislative bodies or city soviets 
should support not only the party in power – ‘Edinaya Rossiya’ (United 
Russia); they also have to support a city manager or a major – their decisions, 
ideas, strategies, etc.  
 
Members of city soviets exchange their political loyalty for economic 
benefits. However, this looks simple only at first glance. As my research 
shows, social capital – but not purely formal loyalty – is the most important 
form of capital for specific entrepreneurs. My respondents, both 
businesspersons who have moved into politics, and experts, paid strong 
89 
 
attention to personal ties and close relations, mentioning them as an important 
condition for economic success. Business actors quite often do not have a 
strong obligation to “pay off” received benefits. In other words, the exchange 
is not rarely based on pure personal relations, not on material interests, as used 
to be emphasised in the literature on Russian corruption.46     
 
However, relations between local authorities and entrepreneurs are mostly 
informal and kept in the shadows. That is the nature of local relations, where 
informal deals and communications are more effective in the decision-making 
process than official agreements. The latter requires more time, effort and 
other costs. Informal state-business groups on the municipal level include 
different representatives of local politics, regional patrons, small (or mid-size) 
business, and various state agents. In contemporary Russia, politicians and 
bureaucrats are included in business activities as owners or managers. 
Reasonably, it is not easy to separate politics from business, because they 
create a set of symbiotic structures. For example, many city authorities in 
Russia own a few firms and businesses. 
  
The common origin of city authorities and owners of double identity 
simplifies their professional communication, the creation of trust and 
networks. Their similar business origins provide certainty, common values 
and norms. However, for my research another side of the narrative was more 
important. These informal groups are characterised by the replacement of 
market relations with quasi-market practices, where enforcement and 
violence are more effective and widespread than pure market practices. 
Informal state-business groups on the municipal level are based on social 
                                                          
46 Susan Rose-Ackerman, Corruption and Government.  
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connections, in-group solidarity and contract relations – all components 
esteemed positively by social capital theorists.        
 
There is one other empirical point that seems to contradict the idea about the 
widespread informality in Russian regional-local relations. My research 
shows that politically affiliated entrepreneurs are not interested in the 
implementation of trust networks and special relations with state officials 
without compelling reasons. This is because administrative support requires 
a payoff which ultimately causes the dependency of an entrepreneur. It sounds 
trivial, but reciprocal relations with state agents and local authorities are not 
always profitable for the double identity owners, even if benefits are 
important and available. In some cases it is more profitable and safer to follow 
market strategies and not seek administrative resources. Personal agreements 
are not based on official contracts, which is why opportunism is highly 
probable and not preventable. There is one important exception – the threat 
to property rights. In such cases entrepreneurs do not hesitate to use their 
specific positions within political structures to prevent potential attacks. 
 
I am head of the organization, I visit all events and meetings, and they 
[competitors] are afraid of me. I am familiar with the city manager. It is 
impossible to grab away my business, because by the time I had made a name, 
I was not infamous businessman They were afraid that I could use some 
connections, networks, or some personal contacts somewhere (interview with 
a  member of regional parliament, businessman, trade business).   
 
Unexpectedly, my research shows that actors with double identity occupy a 
vulnerable position. It is easy for city managers or governors to force private 
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owners to vote for any decision or to support their politics. One informant in 
Saint-Petersburg provided an example how this works: a  member of a city 
soviet decided not to vote for a bill because it contradicted his personal 
position and political values. He was going to leave the city for couple of days 
by road, when he was stopped by police and forced to go back to take part in 
a vote on the bill.  
 
Conclusions 
 
This study shows that informality and trust networks within the political 
sphere play an important role in entrepreneurial success of even small and 
mid-size business. State-business connections on the local level are more 
personalised and based mainly on mutual trust than on corrupt dependence, 
as in elite networks. I found that entrepreneurs who occupy positions in 
regional parliaments and city soviets, could be defined as privileged market 
actors. They have access to advantages and opportunities crucial to business 
security in contrast to so-called ordinary entrepreneurs. 
 
On the one hand, privileged entrepreneurs, as others, do not trust the state and 
its institutions. On the other hand, they create and support social ties and 
informal relations to state representatives in order to protect their businesses 
from the threatening activities of fiscal and other state control bodies. As the 
research prove, specific entrepreneurs convert politically connected 
informality into economic benefits. The paradox of the described practices is 
that in order to protect and develop their firms businesspersons need to 
become a part of the state. The rules governing informality and social capital 
exploitation within political sphere become more visible when we compare 
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the practices and norms of politically affiliated entrepreneurs in contrast of 
ordinary market actors.  
 
The research on politically connected entrepreneurs in Russian cities concerns 
the more fundamental question of what constitutes the logic of interaction 
between the state and markets, and between private actors and state agents in 
the post-Soviet space. Another important finding concerns personal skills and 
behaviour within the political space. Opportunities caused by political status 
are not enough for business success, which requires the ability to use them in 
an appropriate way, and depends on personal characteristics and human 
capital (knowledge, professional and communication skills, and personal 
influence). Moreover, different economic and political players, with various 
amounts of political, economic, social and other sorts of capital, compete with 
each other for access to privileges.  
 
The idea of the crucial meaning of informality, patronage and personal 
connections to political figures is not new in transition economies, including 
the post-Soviet states. A broader question is how the movement from business 
to politics mirrors the nature of markets and entrepreneurship in developing 
market economies. Investigating specific entrepreneurs improves our 
knowledge not only of post-Soviet development, but of the diversity of 
entrepreneurial practices. 
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Appendix 1. 
Map of the Barents Region  
 
 
Source: Arctic Centre. University of Lapland.  
http://www.arcticcentre.org/EN/communications/arcticregion/Maps 
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Appendix 2.  
Proportion of businesspeople in regional parliaments of North-West federal 
okrug  
 
Author’s calculations 
Legislative bodies were elected in 2008-2012 years. 
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